

# **A balance-sheet approach to fiscal sustainability\***

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# A Balance-Sheet Approach to Fiscal Sustainability<sup>1</sup>

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## Abstract

This paper proposes a new methodology to assess fiscal sustainability. Our approach relies on computing both government's assets and liabilities as opposed to focusing only on explicit liabilities. Assets are primarily the present discounted value of taxes, while liabilities are primarily the present discounted value of expenditures in addition to explicit liabilities. By looking at the government's balance sheet we can compute the net worth of government, as well as evaluate its response to growth, commodity prices or real exchange rate shocks. We show that the implications for fiscal sustainability may be different from those obtained by focusing only on explicit liabilities as in the traditional approaches.

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## I. Introduction

The issue of debt sustainability has been the focus of continued theoretical and practical interest over the years. As the investor base and the menu of instruments of sovereign borrowing has become deeper, the tools to assess sustainability have remained at the forefront of the public policy debate in emerging economies. Moreover, the recent surge in debt ratios around the world as a result of the fiscal stimuli and the output contraction due to the Covid-19 pandemic not only has added an additional sense of urgency to the discussion in the developing world, but has also triggered a debate in most advanced economies centered on the extent to which historically low interest rates ( $r < g$ ) should be factored into the sustainability evaluation –including whether the concept of sustainability should be altogether revised.<sup>4</sup>

In spite of this debate the empirical characterization of debt sustainability remains elusive. Wyplosz (2011) puts it nicely, fiscal solvency is a “known unknown” and assessing it is “mission impossible”. The reason is straightforward: fiscal sustainability has to do with expectations about future outcomes which are always difficult to assess. On a more fundamental level, one could argue that sustainability always prevails, as, at the end of the day, budget constraints always hold (see Buiter, 2002). In this light, fiscal sustainability refers to a situation in which obligations are paid without resorting to a forced restructuring or a default. Even in this case, the definition needs to be refined: should we include as a default the dilution of the debt’s real value through inflation? If so, where do we draw the line between inflation and dilution when we propose scenarios to evaluate debt sustainability?<sup>5</sup> Despite those caveats, traditional debt sustainability analysis (DSA) assumes away dilution as a credit event; in this paper, we follow that criterion.

Relatedly, and closer to the focus of this paper, the debate in the emerging markets world has typically focused on outright defaults and, as a result, on the role of currency mismatches. However, both in the literature and in the financial industry, the emphasis is placed on the currency composition of *explicit* government *liabilities* –the idea being that the presence of foreign-

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<sup>4</sup> See Barro (2020), Cochrane (2020) and Svensson (2020) for sobering arguments against this last point, and Blanchard (2019) for a more nuanced and positive assessment.

<sup>5</sup> A recent survey by Abbas, Pienowzki, and Rogoff (2019) reviews the literature in its current state.

currency denominated obligations the cost of service in the event of a –typically countercyclical– real depreciation, amplifying the fiscal vulnerability of the country.<sup>6</sup>

The key insight of this paper is that documented gross obligations, while relevant, often represent a small share of the government’s capacity to pay; indeed, as an indicator of fiscal solvency, they are relatively uninformative –and possibly misleading– if not matched with the asset side of the government’s balance sheet. Much as in corporate finance, where debt analysis takes into consideration the asset side of the balance sheet and its revenue generating potential, a fiscal sustainability analysis should factor in the value of financial and real government assets as well as the present value of future tax collection. Furthermore, bonded debt is probably a fraction of a government’s spending obligations, which also include public sector wages, pension payments and transfers that cannot be summarily ignored. These undocumented assets and liabilities may be affected by changes in the real exchange rate in a way that dwarfs the impact on explicit liabilities that is the focus of the traditional approach.

The intuition of the need to use a balance-sheet approach to debt sustainability has not been absent in the literature. Debrun et al (2019) argue that “*net worth is a theoretically clear-cut concept, and a conceptually attractive basis to define sustainability*” and conclude that “*a complete government balance sheet nevertheless allows a much better grasp on the risks facing the entire public sector. ... designing stress tests reflecting the full exposure of the balance sheet to adverse developments can certainly improve upon the stress testing approach*”. Arrow et al. (2004) also suggest that a *non-decreasing net worth* is the right concept of sustainability. Neither of these papers, however, proposes a way to estimate the country’s net worth empirically.

Against this background, in this paper we propose a methodology to implement the balance-sheet approach that, as illustrated by the practical applications included here, radically alters the results obtained using traditional sustainability evaluations.

The ultimate goal of our research is to produce a methodology that is both operational and replicable, and that could complement the standard sustainability assessments regularly conducted

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<sup>6</sup> See Calvo et al (2003), Hausmann and Panizza (2003), and Levy Yeyati (2004). See Levy Yeyati (2021) for a recent survey and Forni and Turner (2021) for an extension of the argument to corporate debt.

by analysts, market practitioners and official lenders. To do so, the paper discusses in some detail the conceptual issues that distinguish the new approach from the traditional one, and highlights the implications of this new approach in terms of the incidence of currency imbalances and the exposure to real exchange rate swings.

Intuitively, while fiscal liabilities (most notably, pensions and wages that comprise the largest part of current expenditure in most developing economies) are largely denominated in the domestic currency, taxes collected on the tradable sector of the economy are partially “dollarized” (denominated in, or indexed to hard currencies), particularly in the case of commodity exporters where a significant share of the exported production is owned or taxed by the government. In that case, from a balance-sheet perspective, a real depreciation may enhance the net worth of the government –even when government debt is partially dollarized– by diluting the real value of domestic currency liabilities and increasing the base of fiscal resources. Not surprisingly, governments more often than not *use* a devaluation to *mitigate* their fiscal problems, a practice that can be better understood from a balance-sheet perspective. More generally, for a given debt level and structure, the exposure to real exchange rate shocks computes differently once the fiscal balance is broken into its individual components, and the effect of the shocks is estimated on *all* components.

Measuring debt sustainability by relating debts to assets (rather than the more traditional debt-to-GDP ratio) also shed new light on shocks that have an impact on the asset side of the balance sheet but not on debt ratios (in the short run). A hike in oil prices –or an increase in proven oil reserves– may have a muted impact on traditional debt ratios despite the fact that they affect solvency in a critical way. Similarly, changes in future liabilities –as a result, for example, of a pension reform– have a direct impact on government’s net worth but no ostensible effect on debt ratios. In traditional DSA, these effects are captured through their expected impact on current account and primary balances, but not are not integrated in the evolution of the summary measure of indebtedness: the debt ratio.

The paper is organized as follows. Section II provides a brief survey of the related literature. Section III presents our balance sheet approach and describes the methodology. Section IV applies the methodology to the cases of Argentina, Chile and Namibia. Section VI concludes.

## *II. Sustainability and solvency: what's in the menu?*

Determining fiscal sustainability, namely, the government's ability to repay existing obligations over the indefinite future, presents a daunting task that cannot be addressed in the form of simple summary indicators. Governments will claim that they can make the payments –generate the needed primary surpluses to do so– even when history or common sense tends to suggest that the attainable surplus depends on growth, interest rates, and real exchange rate, factors that are largely beyond the control of the government in the short run and on which forecasts by the parties involved often disagree. Moreover, debt sustainability in practice is often defined not in terms of repayment but rather as a stable (sustainable) debt ratio.

It follows that assessing debt sustainability is as much informed art as it is rigorous science, and can be tackled through a wide range of alternative methodologies. Abbas, Piencowzki, and Rogoff (2019) and Chalk and Hemming (2000) provide excellent surveys of the traditional approaches and their practical application to developing economies.<sup>7</sup> The purpose of this section is not to provide a new survey of this growing literature, but rather to summarily cover three key aspects: i) the basic intertemporal approach, which gives a rule of thumb to evaluate sustainability under the assumption that the economy is in its steady state; ii) the link between the real exchange rate and sustainability in the traditional approach; and iii) the link between sustainability and the volatility of key drivers such as growth and financial market conditions.

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<sup>7</sup> See also Bohn (1995); Díaz Alvarado et al. (2004); Mendoza and Oviedo (2004); Brumm, Kotlikoff, and Kubler (2020); Hasanhodzi (2020); and Sergeyev and Mehrotra (2020) for alternative takes on the subject.

*The Basic Intertemporal Approach*<sup>8</sup>

We start from a basic debt accumulation equation ignoring, for the time being, the distinction between local and foreign currency debt (specifically, we assume that debt is denominated in the local currency):

$$D_{t+1} - D_t = i_{t+1}D_t - P_{t+1} \quad (19)$$

where  $P_{t+1}$  is the primary surplus at  $t+1$ ,  $D_{t+1}$  is the total end-of- $t+1$  public debt stock, and  $i_{t+1}$  is the interest rate at period  $t+1$ .

Dividing both sides by GDP and rearranging, we obtain:

$$d_{t+1} = \frac{(1+i_{t+1})}{(1+g_{t+1})}d_t - p_{t+1} \quad (20)$$

where lower case letters denote ratios over GDP, and  $g_{t+1}$  is the GDP growth rate from  $t$  to  $t+1$ .

Substituting forward and imposing the “no Ponzi game condition” that the present value of future debt as a percentage of GDP must converge to zero yields the present value budget constraint:

$$d_t = \sum_{v=0}^{\infty} R_{t+1,v} p_{t+1+v} \quad (1)$$

where  $R_{t+1,v} \equiv \prod_{s=0}^v \frac{1+g_{t+1+s}}{1+i_{t+1+s}}$ . This just says that the debt stock has to equal the present value of future primary surpluses.

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<sup>8</sup> This section draws on Blanchard (1990) and Chalk and Hemming (2000).



In what sense is (1) a “debt sustainability condition”? Other than imposing the no-Ponzi-games condition—which follows from the very basic idea that individuals holding government debt will not allow the government to run a “Ponzi game” in which debt is rolled over forever—equation (1) is derived using only accounting identities. Here, the present value budget constraint simply tells us that there must be consistency between today’s debt stock and the projected path of primary surpluses, interest rates, and growth, but not how this consistency is to be achieved. This could be done, for example, by adjusting the present debt stock through a restructuring, or diluting it through inflation surprises (which bring nominal growth above nominal interest rates, increasing the discount factor  $R$ ). In other words, the present value budget constraint is a condition on future primary surpluses only if one assumes that the government avoids these other ways of adjusting—that is, if both the current debt stock and the path of  $g$  and  $i$  are assumed to be exogenous, rather than—at least partially—endogenously determined by policy choices.

However, even when this assumption is made, the present value budget constraint imposes little “discipline” on the result, since there are infinitely many primary surplus paths that would make the equation hold. Whether debt is sustainable or not boils down to the question of whether at least some sustainable path is feasible. How do we know if this is the case? In essence, three approaches have been suggested and applied in practice.

First, one can impose “discipline” artificially, by way of a thought experiment, pretending that the economy is in steady state, and considering only flat primary surplus paths—in what is usually referred to as “static sustainability analysis”. Thus, assuming that the interest rate and GDP growth rate are constant, equation (1) becomes:

$$d_t = \sum_{v=0}^{\infty} \left( \frac{1+g}{1+i} \right)^{v+1} p_{t+1+v} \quad (2)$$

If, in addition, we assume the primary surplus to be constant over time, we obtain:

$$p = d_t \left[ \frac{1+i}{1+g} - 1 \right] = d_t \left[ \frac{i-g}{1+g} \right], \quad (3)$$

assuming that

$$0 < \frac{1+g}{1+i} < 1,$$

which gives the level of primary surplus that makes the current debt sustainable (or stable to be more precise), a measure that can be computed very easily. While (3) is a useful rule of thumb, the underlying static sustainability approach is incomplete, as it does not deal with the possible uncertainty regarding GDP and interest rate paths, and it abstracts from complications that arise if a portion of the debt is denominated foreign currency –two issues to which we return later in the paper.

In addition, one implication of the static DSA is that it delivers something stronger than we actually need, namely, a primary surplus path that not only makes the debt sustainable, but also keeps it constant at its current level, while there is no reason to assume that the current debt-to-GDP ratio is optimal.<sup>9</sup>

In practice, this problem can be dealt with in two ways. The first one is a more flexible version of the static approach, in which equation (3) is used to calculate the required long-run primary surplus, while the short- and medium-run debt dynamics that might lead to that long run are modeled explicitly, assuming alternative transition paths for interest rates, growth, and the primary surplus. This is the way in which debt sustainability analysis has traditionally been conducted by country authorities and international financial institutions such as the IMF (Chalk and Hemming, 2000)<sup>10</sup>.

An alternative approach, based on Bohn (1998), which has also been applied to developing countries (IMF 2003a, Abiad and Ostry, 2005), models explicitly the primary surplus as a function of control variables such as the debt stock, the growth rate and the interest rate using historical

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<sup>9</sup> Additionally, this framework is silent about the practical feasibility of the “sustainable” primary surplus.

<sup>10</sup> An application of this methodology that leads to interesting insights is Broda and Weinstein (2004), who look separately at Japan’s future liability and income flows and conclude that there is no serious solvency problem in spite of the very high debt levels and the negative demographic dividend from an ageing population.

data, and assesses fiscal sustainability by comparing the present value of the fitted primary surpluses (predicted based on projected values of the controls) with the outstanding debt. The advantage of this method is that it systematizes the historical evidence and models fiscal accounts more realistically; its disadvantage is that it assumes that the ability and willingness of the country's authorities to generate primary surpluses will be the same in the future as it was in the past, ruling out the exceptional fiscal performance that is sometimes observed in the event of a crises –or around crises– as the case of the recent Greek fiscal program illustrates. Thus, while this approach may be a reasonable starting point if the goal is to assess sustainability based on *current* policies, it may be negatively biased about the government's capacity to adjust in crisis periods.<sup>11</sup> More importantly, to the extent that the projections at the core of this approach are often based on long historical series, they may miss most of the effect of *policy changes that have already taken place*, providing a biased depiction of the current scenario.<sup>12</sup>

*How does a devaluation affect fiscal sustainability in the traditional approach?*<sup>13</sup>

Because the currency composition of debt may differ from that of the GDP (used to normalize debt ratios) or of government resources (which in turn determined its capacity to pay), it is critical to keep track of the currency denomination of assets and liabilities. Ignoring the distinction between end-of-period and period-average exchange rates, the debt-to-GDP ratio  $d$  can be expressed as:

$$d = \frac{D + eD^*}{Y + eY^*}, \quad (4)$$

where  $e$  is the real exchange rate (defined as the price of non-tradable goods relative to tradable goods),  $D$  is debt payable in the domestic currency,  $D^*$  is debt payable in a foreign currency,  $Y$  is the output of non-tradables, and  $Y^*$  is the output of tradables.

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<sup>11</sup> See Abiad and Ostry (2005) for refinements of the endogenous primary surplus approach that attempts to address this objection.

<sup>12</sup> Another limitation of the approach is that it continues to rely on projected fundamentals. We return to this issue below.

<sup>13</sup> This section closely follows Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2002).

Mismatches between debt and output currency composition can amplify the impact of real exchange rate variations on the debt ratio. At one extreme, suppose  $(B/eB^*)/(Y/eY^*) = 1$ , so that the composition of debt and output is perfectly matched. In this case, a real depreciation has no effect on the debt ratio. Now consider the opposite case: an indebted, closed economy where output is denominated in non-tradables and all debt is foreign denominated, so that  $d = eB^*/Y$ . Now a real exchange rate adjustment reflects one to one on the debt ratio.<sup>14</sup>

This analysis, however, is partially silent on the response of fiscal accounts as a result of a real devaluation. While it may recognize that a fraction of GDP –and tax revenue– is linked to a foreign currency, it abstracts from the fact that the main public liability (and the main fiscal outlays) is not associated with the debt service but rather with spending promises, most of which, particularly wages and pensions, are quoted in domestic currency and tend to be diluted in a high depreciation-high inflation scenario. In particular, as long as wages and pensions behave adjust to a real depreciation only partially, we should expect the higher debt service to be partially offset (or, in some cases, even outweighed) by the improvement in the primary balance.<sup>15</sup>

### *Dealing with Uncertainty*

From the previous discussion, it is clear that projected paths of output, interest rates, real exchange rates –as well as any additional determinant of the primary surplus– is critical for a fiscal sustainability assessment. How can one deal with the uncertainty surrounding these projections?

Two broad approaches have been applied in practice. The first one, popular among practitioners, consist in testing a particular DSA scenario using “stress tests” that assume large deviations of the critical drivers. These stress tests answer whether the debt would still be sustainable if, for example, there is a sharp rise in international interest rates, a dramatic deterioration of terms of

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<sup>14</sup> Calvo et al (2003) illustrate this point by estimating the effects of 50% real depreciation in a selected group of emerging economies. Using 1998 debt stocks and focusing on the relative price adjustment —that is, assuming that interest rates and GDP growth remain unchanged—. they argue that the debt ratio would have jumped from 36.5 percent of GDP to 50.8 in dollarized Argentina, whereas it would have barely moved (from 17.3 percent to 18.7 percent) in non-dollarized Chile.

<sup>15</sup> Note that, even if real wages (measured in CPI units) are kept constant, fiscal revenues, often proportional to the nominal GDP, will tend to outpace wages to the extent whenever the tradable component of the GDP exceeds that of the consumption basket.

trade, or a sudden economic slowdown. To choose a “reasonably adverse” scenario, one could calibrate (permanent and transitory) shocks based on the stochastic behavior of the relevant variables in the recent past. The International Monetary Fund has refined this method in several ways (IMF, 2005c) and has used it extensively in its programs.

Although this approach is useful to highlight the sensitivity of the DSA to a range of plausible scenarios, it disregards the joint distribution of shocks (its covariances) as well as the joint dynamic response of the relevant policy variables. In response to these drawbacks, a number of authors have recently attempted to estimate the variance-covariance matrix of the shocks and used these estimates to generate probabilistic forecasts of the drivers of debt dynamics. These forecasts can then be used to stress test the evolution of debt ratios; specifically, to estimate the probability that debt ratios rise beyond a pre-specified threshold.

The approaches discussed above differ, in particular, with respect to whether and how the government’s behavior should be modeled. However, most of them share a basic methodological perspective: a vector autoregression is estimated to simulate the key exogenous debt drivers, fiscal policy is treated as endogenous (either by including the primary balance in the vector autoregression, or by separately estimating a policy reaction function), and a probability distribution of the debt ratio is generated using Monte Carlo simulations. The results can be presented in highly intuitive ways; for example, Ferrucci and Penalver (2003) and Celasun, Debrun and Ostry (2005) use “fan-charts” familiar from the inflation forecasting literature to illustrate the distribution of paths of debt ratios, whereas Garcia and Rigobón (2004) report impulse-response charts to illustrate the trajectory of debt ratios in response to a variety of shocks—in the spirit of “stress tests” but on more solid econometric grounds. To varying degrees, these methods encompass and enrich the traditional one. A different strand, borrowing from the financial literature, has tried to extend the now standard Value-at-Risk approach to the fiscal accounts (Barnhill and Kopitz, 2003).

With the exception of the static approach, all of these models pay due attention to the concept of vulnerability that points at the importance of the negative tail of the distribution of the debt ratio,

in contrast with the emphasis on the expected (average) level placed by the traditional DSA. All of these models, however, relate debt ratios to either reduced forms of the underlying future primary surplus or, at best, to the composition of *explicit* liabilities (documented debt stocks).

Note that, by using historical fiscal data from a long period (usually the previous ten or twenty years), the model implicitly assumes that the country could carry in the future the same fiscal policy as in the estimation period, whereas the analysis should in principle be tuned to the *current* fiscal policy. Conversely, using data from a shorter period (as in Garcia and Rigobón, 2004, who focus on monthly data for the last three years) reflects accurately the underlying structure of fiscal accounts, at the expense of masking most of the cyclical dynamics of the relevant shocks.<sup>16</sup> The use of historical data needs to be carefully vetted by examining whether it is representative of the both the cyclical and the current patterns of the determinants of the country's balance sheet, an inevitable tradeoff that can only be sorted out based on informed but nonetheless subjective criteria.

### *III. The Balance sheet approach*

In a recent analysis of sovereign debt statistics (which included the Americas as well as some other key emerging and developed economies), Cowan et al (2006) unveiled a number of cases in which governments have made an effort to bring their debt numbers closer to the net worth concept underlying our balance sheet approach. Brazil, for example, reports only net public debt (that is, debt net of international reserves). Argentina has recently moved to the same system, balancing out the debt owed to the national government by the provinces.<sup>17</sup> Mexico computes a net debt number by netting some off-balance sheet assets. Canada, in turn, reports a debt figure net of public assets, where the latter includes both liquid assets and other computable government claims such as student loans.<sup>18</sup> Finally, the US also reports a net debt concept.

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<sup>16</sup> Our approach addresses this problem by estimating the individual components of the primary surplus based on the historical behavior of the relevant determinants, aggregating them using the current tax and income structure.

<sup>17</sup> In 2002, the federal government offered subnational government a debt swap by which it took over provincial debt in exchange of new claims on the provinces.

<sup>18</sup> In an early precedent, Buitier (1985) has suggested that items typically excluded by the conventional approach should be an integral part of sustainability analysis,

Perhaps the clearer example in this regard is New Zealand, which, in compliance with the Public Finance Act of 1989 (Part III), must prepare annual consolidated financial statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting practices.<sup>19</sup> New Zealand's approach falls short of the comprehensive net worth concept that we propose here in that, while it considers liquid and physical *assets* –including items such as public roads or the national library that may be considered of little “redeemable value”– it ignores the present value of future government resources –less straightforward to value but economically more important. It does come closer to our approach on the liability side, where they add the actuarial value of pension fund liabilities.

With the exception of New Zealand, it seems that governments accept that assets that have the necessary liquidity (reserves), were issued with an equivalent collateral (debt operations) or are one-off deviations from normal behavior (Mexico's financial losses due to the 1995 bank bailout) should be netted out from the debt stock figure. In line with this, and to make debt numbers more coherent across countries, Cowan et al (2005) propose three debt definitions, including one that consolidates government debt held by the central bank and other quasi fiscal entities (including social security funds). At any rate, all these attempts are only halfway efforts that, while closer to a balance-sheet depiction of the debt situation, fall short of providing a summary statistic of fiscal sustainability.

Table 1 presents a scheme of the government's balance sheet and the resulting net worth. Measuring each of these components is not straightforward and entails methodological choices. For example: Should physical and nontangible assets be treated as “marketable” in that they could be used to cancel financial obligations, as it was the case, for example, under Brady-type exchanges in the early 90s? Should debt be valued at face or market value (reflecting the possibility of a buy

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<sup>19</sup> Specifically, they must include, in addition to financial statements, a statement of borrowings, a statement of no used expenses and capital expenditures, a statement of emergency expenses and capital expenditure, a statement of trust money administered by department and offices of Parliament, and any additional information and explanations needed to fairly reflect the consolidated financial operation and its financial position. They must also include the government's interest in all Crown entities, all organizations, state enterprises, parliament and the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, as well as that of any other entity whose financial statement must be consolidated into the financial statements of the Government to comply with generally accepted accounting practice.

back)? Should contingent liabilities be taken at their actuarial value? Should the cash flow from state-owned-enterprises (SOE) –which typically includes a subsidy component–, the social security system or tax revenues be extended forward assuming today’s legislation? <sup>20</sup> Last but not least, given that the balance sheet is the present value of future flows, what discount rate should be used in the analysis?

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<sup>20</sup> This appears to be the natural choice if sustainability is to be evaluated based on the current policy mix. Stress tests on net worth based on specific policy changes can be used to complement the analysis.



Table 1. The balance sheet

Assets	Liabilities
Liquid Assets	Explicit Liabilities
Physical Assets	Contingent Liabilities
NPV of taxes	(NPV Social Security)
Net worth of SOE	(NPV Health insurance)
	(NPV Other expenditures)
	Net Worth

The implementation of our methodology follows directly from the balance sheet in Table 1. Our measurement choices are the following. On the asset side, we compute liquid assets at their current market value. Because many countries have actually run down significantly their reserve levels at times –and more generally because they are liquid assets that can be disposed of almost immediately at any point in time– we choose to include the full value of reserves in our estimation of the value of assets.<sup>21</sup> Physical assets are also valued at market value to the extent that they can be readily disposed of, but we choose not to include physical assets that are unlikely to be sold or outsourced on short notice at a reasonable price (roads, government buildings, IMF quotas, etc.).<sup>22</sup> Finally, the net worth of SOEs should come from its approximate market value whenever there is one.

Importantly, the main component of the asset side is also the most difficult to evaluate: the net present value of taxes. To compute this, we need to estimate a path of future tax revenues. To simplify our discussion, we deliberately abstract from potential changes in tax policy, and take the current tax structure as given and constant moving forward. This means that we discuss the sustainability of the *current fiscal* policy, although alternative scenarios where fiscal policy changes can also be incorporated. More precisely, we estimate how tax revenues respond to key exogenous variables, project revenues as a function of the (projected) evolution of those variables, and discount the revenue flow to obtain its present value. Regarding the liability side, with the exception of liabilities with a predetermined cash flow such as net social security outlays and debt

<sup>21</sup> Alternatively, we may assume a reserve floor and subtract that from the asset count.

<sup>22</sup> Again, this is a nontrivial choice. For example, we may argue that IMF quotas determine the size of SDR issuances that were distributed and used as non-redeemable hard currency in the past two global crises and therefore should be partially considered; we exclude them because of the uncertainty about this income flow.

payments (which are computed separately), government spending is estimated, as before, as a function of a few exogenous variables.

The methodology consists of the following four steps:

1. Define a set of exogenous variables (in our examples, GDP, the real exchange rate and the international interest rate) and estimate a model that simulates their future evolution.<sup>23</sup> This set of variables can be country specific and can be expanded at the discretion of the evaluator.
2. Estimate response functions for specific components of income and expenditures; in our case, standard OLS regressions of revenues and spending items on the exogenous variables of choice.
3. Generate paths for the exogenous variables bootstrapping the VAR residuals and simulate income and expenditure flows by plugging the paths simulated for the exogenous variables into the revenue and spending functions calibrated in (2); then compute the primary surplus.
4. Add the predetermined cash flows (typically social security liabilities and debt payments), to obtain the government's cash flow, and discount everything to compute the government's net worth (the net present value of the government's cash flows) for each simulated path to obtain *a distribution of the sovereign's net worth*, the summary expression of fiscal sustainability according to the balance-sheet approach.

In what follows, we illustrate each of these steps by means of two practical applications: Argentina (a highly indebted country prone to debt restructurings) and Chile (a fiscally sound investment-grade country). Despite the generality of the methodology proposed here, going over these individual cases in detail is important because it flags a series of practical, country-specific issues that arise when taking the conceptual framework to the data. We choose to run the estimations for the period 1990 to 2005 (Chile) and 1993 to 2005 (Argentina), a period of relative stable inflation

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<sup>23</sup> Notice that this implies that we assume that the evolution of output and the real exchange rate are independent of fiscal policy in the short run.

that comprises the first financial cycle in emerging Latin America –with capital inflows in the early 90s, briefly interrupted by the contagion from the 1994 Mexican crisis, and capital outflows in the late 90s driven by the dollar cycle and punctuated by the East Asian crises and the Russian sovereign default. We complement these results with an application to a non-financially integrated country, Namibia, going all the way to 2020.

### III. 1. *Modeling the environment*

We model the macroeconomic environment by means of a simple VAR representation of three exogenous variables: the international interest rate, the level of the real exchange rate and the rate of growth of real GDP. The general specification has the following form:

$$y_t = A(L)y_t + BX_t + v_t,$$

where  $y$  stands for the vector of endogenous variables. Typically, these variables should be tested for stationarity, and the VAR specification could include a set of additional exogenous variables,  $X$ . The matrix  $A(L)$  is constrained to reflect the case of a small open economy, assuming that the international interest rate is exogenous to the exchange rate and output. From the VAR we obtain the dynamic response function as well as an estimate of the shocks to the exogenous variables. These are then used to compute a stochastic path for the endogenous variables, bootstrapping from the joint distribution of shocks implied by the residual matrix  $v$ .

Table A.1 in the appendix reports the VAR coefficients. The approach laid out here benefits from some degree of informed flexibility. To generate consistent estimates for Argentina we allow for a structural break in the level of the real exchange rate to capture the devaluation of the first quarter of 2002. In all cases, the international interest rate is introduced as an exogenous variable and modeled separately as an independent AR process. Finally, the specification for Chile includes a fourth exogenous variable: the price of copper, a key country-specific determinant of fiscal accounts (most copper production is state-owned and managed), modeled as exogenous to local output and real exchange rates, according to two alternative specifications: a random walk (Figure 1.b.i), and an AR(1) process (Figure 1.b.ii).

### III. 2. Modeling fiscal accounts as a function of exogenous variables

#### III.2.1 Taxes and current expenditures

A critical part of our analysis refers to the sensitivity of the income and expenditure lines in the balance sheet with respect to the exogenous variables in the VAR.<sup>24</sup> These sensitivities can be computed from historical data provided that they exhibit a relatively stable link. As noted, we do not model the deficit as a function of our exogenous variables based on historical data; rather, we break down the fiscal accounts into its individual revenue and expenditure components and use historical data to estimate the elasticity of each of the latter with respect to the relevant exogenous variables. We then apply these estimated elasticities to predict future changes relative to the *current* value of revenues and expenditures. In this way, we can estimate the deficit as a function of the exogenous variables for the *current* fiscal policy mix.

A general equation could be written for each source of revenue or expense:

$$\begin{aligned} R_{it} &= GDP_t t_i e^{\alpha_i q_t} e^{\beta_i \Delta gdp_t} e^{X\beta} e^{\varepsilon_{it}}, \\ E_{it} &= GDP_t s_i e^{\alpha_i q_t} e^{\beta_i \Delta gdp_t} e^{X\beta} e^{\varepsilon_{it}}, \end{aligned} \quad (5)$$

where  $R$  ( $E$ ) and  $GDP$  refer to nominal revenues (expenditures) and output,  $t$  ( $s$ ) is the average *effective* tax (spending) rate which may change with real GDP ( $gdp$ ), if tax compliance or public spending display cyclicalities. Considering that  $e p^*/p_{NT} = q$ , the specification assumes that each tax revenue and expense has a certain “tradability”, understood here as their elasticity with respect to the real exchange rate.<sup>25</sup> Both the elasticity with respect to the real exchange rate and to real growth can be estimated by running a log version of equation (5) for each line of the primary surplus. The estimation equation for revenue is

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<sup>24</sup> For brevity, we will refer to both the  $X$ ’s and the  $y$ ’s as “exogenous” variables, as they are assumed to be independent from the fiscal accounts calculated below.

<sup>25</sup> This elasticity will be critical when we estimate the balance sheet vulnerability to a real depreciation in the next section.

$$\ln\left(\frac{R_{it}}{GDP_t}\right) = \alpha_i q_{it} + \beta_i \ln \Delta gdp_t + \ln t_i + X\beta + \varepsilon_{it}, \quad (6)$$

where  $X$  stands for other exogenous variables that affect tax revenues or expenditure decisions.<sup>26</sup>

In practice, the output and real exchange rate elasticities for income and expenditure data are estimated by studying the relationship between revenues and expenditures as percentage of GDP with output growth and the real exchange rate, correcting for seasonality (which applies when the data is of higher than annual frequency). Additionally, where there has been a sharp change in tax collection (but not on tax rates, as the estimation was deliberately done over periods of stable rates), a time trend is included. For a few equations we included time dummies for the last period or the last four quarters to control for recent –possibly permanent– increases.

Tables 2a and 2b show how income and expenditure relate to GDP growth and the real exchange rate in the case of Argentina (see Table A.2 in the appendix show the results for the case of Chile). The table shows that fiscal components are strongly linked to the exogenous variables. Value added tax and income tax compliance increases with GDP, but their share in GDP falls with the real exchange rate, possibly as a result of the association of high real exchange rates with sharp economic downturns. Export taxes are naturally linked to the real exchange rate (Table 2a). Other income responds less to GDP, but in the same way to the real exchange rate, and the financial transaction tax is unresponsive to both. On the expenditure side, government consumption and capital expenditure increase with growth and decline with a real depreciation, while transfers increase with the real exchange but are not affected by output growth.

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<sup>26</sup> Example may also include quarterly dummies if taxes are due on specific quarters, or time trends if the tax is converging to a new steady state.

Table 2a. Income sources and economic variables

	Value Added Tax	Income Tax	Debits and Credits Tax	Other income	Exports
Log(real exchange rate)	-0.013** (0.002)	-0.015** (0.004)	0.002 (0.002)	-0.007* (0.003)	0.041** (0.002)
Growth of GDP	0.174** (0.047)	0.078 (0.045)	-0.005 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.052)	-0.149** (0.044)
Constant	0.071** (0.002)	0.018** (0.003)	0.014** (0.002)	0.053** (0.002)	0.086** (0.002)
Other control variables	No	Yes	No	No	No
R-squared	0.473	0.747	0.084	0.142	0.882

Table 2b. Expenditure and economic variables

	Government Consumption	Transfers	Capital Expenditures
Log(real exchange rate)	-0.003** (0.001)	0.016** (0.003)	-0.004** (0.001)
Growth of GDP	0.025* (0.012)	0.069 (0.066)	0.070** (0.024)
Constant	0.036** (0.001)	0.074** (0.004)	0.015** (0.001)
Other control variables	Yes	Yes	No
R-squared	0.674	0.418	0.230

Finally, as noted, for expenditure items such as financial expenses or contingent social security liabilities for which the actuarial value is known at the time of the computation, no estimation is needed –although the researcher may ponder whether or not to include the variations implied by possible changes in legislation (for example, through a social security reform).

### *III. 3. Simulating the exogenous variables and income and expenditure flows*

The third step follows directly from steps 1 and 2. The exogenous variables are forecast by bootstrapping the VAR residuals. Figure 1 shows the results of this exercise for Argentina and Chile, with the corresponding standard errors in a fan-chart graphical representation (where the outer area covers 95% of the distribution). Cash flows beyond the 20<sup>th</sup> year are computed as a

perpetuity based on the steady state values of the exogenous variables.<sup>27</sup> These exogenous variables –more precisely, the 5000 simulations that underlie the charts– are used to generate a stochastic representation of the income and expenditure equations. Figure 1 report the results in fan chart form. Combining these scenarios with the response functions estimated in step 2, we simulate the fiscal flows consistent with each of these simulated environments (Figure 2).

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<sup>27</sup> Steady state refers here to the steady state values of the VAR estimation. In the case of Chile these values entailed a steady state growth rate higher than the interest rate, so we used an arbitrary “developed economy” growth rate of 3%.

Figure 1.a VAR representation of exogenous variables. Argentina




Figure 1.b.i VAR representation of exogenous variables (copper as RW)





Figure 1.b.ii VAR representation of exogenous variables (copper as an AR)



#### III.4. Putting it all together: Estimating net worth

A balance-sheet representation of the net worth breaks it down into its relevant components:



$$V_t(x) = \sum_t \sum_j \frac{a_{jt}(x)}{(1+r)^t} - \sum_t \sum_j \frac{l_{jt}(x)}{(1+r)^t}$$

where  $a$  and  $l$  denote, respectively, the different assets and liabilities identified in the balance sheet of Table 1, and  $x$  are the fundamental variables that determine the value of individual balance-sheet items. The net-worth can then be computed by aggregating the income and expenditure flows simulated in step 3 into a sequence of primary surplus, discounting the result to obtain the net present value.

Figure 2.a Expenditures and income as % of GDP. Argentina




Figure 2.b.i Expenditures and income as % of GDP. Chile (with copper as RW)





Figure 2.b.ii Expenditures and income as % of GDP. Chile (with copper as AR)



nature of the flow? How can we evaluate the solvency of the government ruling out insolvency due to a liquidity run?<sup>28</sup>

The discount factor debate has a long tradition dating back to Ramsey's (1928) assertion that it was "ethically indefensible" for a social planner to discount the future. However, under the influx of revealed preference, it became traditional to assimilate the social welfare problem to that of a representative individual so that the social planner's discount rate became the representative agent's discount rate.<sup>29</sup> A priori, then, it seems reasonable to use the country's opportunity cost as the discount measure.

For a closed economy (autarky) a good approximation would be given by the modified golden rule (even if it differs from the discount rate of an individual or of the social planner).<sup>30</sup> In a financially integrated economy, the social rate of return would in principle be equal to the rate at which the country can borrow or lend in international markets, being the relevant rate the one which is currently binding (the borrowing rate for a net borrower; the lending rate for a net creditor).<sup>31</sup>

However, this solution is still debatable. A borrowing rate that includes a sovereign credit risk premium (as it typically does in developing economies and in standard debt sustainability evaluations) implicitly contradicts the question the exercise intends to answer: what are the conditions under which the country never becomes insolvent. Clearly, in most cases there is an interest rate that, if high and persistent enough, makes debt dynamics explosive leading to

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<sup>28</sup> We deliberately abstract from liquidity problems, which often trigger debt crises, to contrast two often mistaken views of a country's capacity to service its debt: one related to solvency (the focus of this paper) and one related to liquidity (access to finance the debt service).

<sup>29</sup> The idea of building models with preferences that give particular weight to the present (as opposed to the past or the future) is not without criticism (see Caplin and Leahy, 2004, for a discussion).

<sup>30</sup> Recall that the modified golden rule includes a term to account for the fact that population is growing so that in the case of no discounting, by using the modified golden rule the central planner would generate a steady consumption profile across generations by generating a consumption stream that increases at the rate of population growth.

<sup>31</sup> Note that this condition pertains to flows rather than stocks but may be at odds with the net foreign asset position of the country. Assume a country with a fiscal surplus and a large debt maturing many years from now; if debt buybacks are not allowed or are too costly, the fiscal surpluses would be invested abroad at the international rate reducing the negative foreign asset position of the country.

insolvency.<sup>32</sup> To rule out the case of a self-fulfilling liquidity run that eventually evolves into an insolvency episode, we start by assuming solvency (hence, zero credit risk premium) and compute the distribution of net worth based on the path simulated for the international risk-free rate.

### III.4.2 *Computing net worth*

Note that the government's net worth should be computed based on the full simulated path for the relevant exogenous variables, discounted using the simulated interest rate. To do that, we use the complete paths simulated in step 3 and compute the distribution of net worth at  $T=0$ . More precisely, each of the 5000 simulated paths delivers a net worth figure.<sup>33</sup> A distribution of net worth is thus constructed based on these 5000 observations. The results are summarized in Figure 3, which reports the histogram for Argentina and Chile (expressed in terms of current GDP).

For Argentina the curve has a mean at around 2.2 GDPs and does not reach negative territory. Government net worth is strongly skewed to the right indicating the presence of paths with exceptional growth and exceptional revenues. In the case of Chile, the mean is at 7.2 GDPs when copper is modeled as a random walk (4.6 GDPs with copper as a  $AR(1)$ ), and no negative tail.

In the case of Argentina, the exercise delivers a median net worth close to twice the GDP at end-2005 prices. A look at the main components of public finances (Figure 2) shed light on this high figure: in those years Argentina had sharply increased its primary surplus (mainly through new taxes and a reduction of real public wages) and had reduced its liabilities through a debt restructuring.<sup>34</sup> However, it is the negative tail, not the median, that provides a measure of debt sustainability. In this regard, the figure shows that, under the *current* fiscal policy, Argentina is

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<sup>32</sup> Note that traditional studies assume, at the same time, that new debt will continue to pay current risk-adjusted borrowing rates, and that all the debt is actually repaid (to obtain the primary surplus needed to satisfy this hypothesis). This entails an implicit contradiction since certain repayment should eliminate the credit risk premium incorporated in the interest rate.

<sup>33</sup> Since the VAR needs to be estimated jointly, all our estimates are based on quarterly data, the highest frequency at which real output is available. Each path consists of VAR-simulated series of the exogenous variables up to time  $T$ , which are kept invariant thereafter.

<sup>34</sup> For Argentina, the debt numbers are the official estimates and thus do not include potential payments to holdouts or the Paris Club. Notice, however, that the estimated net worth is much larger than the NPV of this debt.

fiscally sustainable in almost all states of the world.<sup>35</sup> Needless to say, one would expect that, in light of this fiscal results, the government will be tempted to modify its fiscal stance in the future by cutting taxes or, more likely, increasing expenditure -as it actually happened in Argentina in the following years.

Figure 3 also highlights the large discrepancies in the volatility of fiscal results in each country. Argentina, which has revenue and expenditure closely correlated with the GDP, exhibits much less volatility than Chile, where income is subject to the volatility of copper prices that are largely uncorrelated with domestic prices.<sup>36</sup>

Another interesting implication that can be obtained from this methodology is the relatively minor role that explicit liabilities play in fiscal solvency. In the case of Argentina, for example, total liabilities add up to a present value of 4,700 billion pesos at 2005 prices, of which debt flows represent only 270 billion, or just 5.7% of total liabilities, illustrating the extent to which the focus on explicit liabilities in sustainability analysis may lead to misleading results.

#### III.4.3 *The response to shocks*

Figure 4 shows how the model can be used to evaluate the fiscal sensitivity to large shocks to the exogenous variables. A decline in the price of copper is a logical stress test for a country like Chile that is heavily dependent on a single commodity export. The figure shows how the distribution of government's net worth shifts after a 42% reduction in the price of copper (arbitrarily chosen for illustrative purposes), even turning negative with a minor probability.

Certainly, in light of the recent debate on financial crises, the most natural stress test for developing countries is a large depreciation, the shock that underlies most recent episodes of financial distress in emerging markets. To this we turn next.

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<sup>35</sup> Another factor that contributes to net worth is the declining share of social security liabilities currently planned. This results from the social security reform of 1994 that transferred most of the workers to a private pension scheme. While this increased the intertemporal solvency of the government, its low coverage of future pensioners anticipates the future creation of contingent liabilities to cover those that will not have any benefits in the future.

<sup>36</sup> Random walks entail growing and unbounded volatility and, as expected, increases the volatility of the estimates obtained for the different paths of the exogenous variables.

Figure 3. Histograms for net worth: Argentina vs. Chile




Figure 4a Change in the copper price (with copper as RW)





Figure 4b. Change in the copper price (with copper as AR)



#### *Real depreciations and fiscal sustainability*

One of the objectives of our exercise is to show that the sensitivity of income and expenditure to the real exchange rate may differ squarely from what can be inferred in the traditional analysis, since both expenditures and taxes are affected, making the overall result ambiguous. This is readily illustrated with the methodology described above, by stress-testing the system with a large one-off real exchange rate depreciation that phases out over time. The effect can be assessed dynamically in a simple way, as the resulting displacement of the distribution of net worth (Figure 5).

In the case of Argentina, the VAR analysis suggests little persistence of the real exchange rate shock, so rather than a temporary shock we simulate a *permanent* 20% real depreciation. We find that Argentina's net worth barely moves, because the increase in debt payments associated to valuation changes in foreign-currency denominated debt is offset by the benign effect of the devaluation on revenues (particularly, from export taxes) and expenditures (particularly, from




public sector wages and pensions).<sup>37</sup> By contrast, Chile sees an important improvement in its net worth with a depreciation of the real exchange rate, albeit for different reasons: as a reflection of a large share of tradable fiscal revenues (copper export) combined with a balanced debt position. Table 3 summarizes the results.

Table 3. The effects of an exchange rate shock on Net Worth (as % of GDP)

	Argentina	Argentina	Chile(WR)	Chile(WR)	Chile(AR)	Chile(AR)
	Basic simulation	With exchange rate shock	Basic simulation	With exchange rate shock	Basic simulation	With exchange rate shock
<b>Mean</b>	2.2	2.2	7.1	8.4	4.5	5.2
<b>Median</b>	2	1.9	5.3	6.2	4.0	4.7
<b>Maximum</b>	11.1	14.4	113	173.7	24.6	33.2
<b>Minimum</b>	0	-0.1	0	0	0.3	0.5
<b>Stand. Dev.</b>	1.3	1.3	6.6	8.2	2.4	2.8

Figure 5a. Argentina: Histogram of net worth in response to a RER shock



<sup>37</sup> It deserves to be noted that the degree of dollarization of (private and public) debt in Argentina declined considerably in the aftermath of the 2001 financial crisis, a decisive factor underlying this result: a similar exercise calibrated to the Argentine context in 2001 would likely yield a large fiscal deterioration as a result of a devaluation.

Figure 5.bi. Chile: Histogram of net worth in response to a RER shock  
(copper modeled as RW)





Figure 5.bii. Chile: Histogram of net worth in response to a RER shock  
(copper modeled as AR(1))



### *Growth and fiscal sustainability*


A typical conclusion of traditional studies of debt sustainability is the fact that growth tends to improve fiscal accounts. Hoping that growth will stir you away from a fiscal crisis is a recurrent idea among policy makers. But this result mostly hinges on assuming revenues to be GDP dependent, while expenditures are considered somewhat more exogenous. Our methodology by establishing a relationship between expenditures and growth may turn a different conclusion. In fact, growth may affect income and resources in different ways. For example, some countries may have political systems that increase expenditures quickly at the first opportunity, so that growth leads to an even more unstable fiscal scenario.

Table 4 and Figure 6, show the results of such an exercise for Namibia. For brevity, we do not show the coefficients (see Sturzenegger and Der Meguerditchian (2021)), and only show here the results to illustrate the point. The three histograms show, first, a baseline case, with negative net worth. In the three other curves steady state growth is notched up by 1% in each. Notice that when we consider how expenditures and spending respond to growth the histogram moves to the left not to the right, so that the conclusion is that growth per se will not solve the fiscal problem. Of course the conclusion is not the Namibian authorities should try to decrease growth, simply that policy action will be required to attain sustainability in those scenarios.

Table 4. The effects of a GDP growth shock on Net Worth

	<b>Basic simulation</b>	<b>GDP growth 1%</b>	<b>GDP growth 2%</b>	<b>GDP growth 3%</b>
<b>Mean</b>	-6.8	-7.3	-7.8	-8.3
<b>Median</b>	-6.3	-6.3	-7.0	-7.5
<b>Maximum</b>	-2.2	-2.5	-2.7	-2.8
<b>Minimum</b>	-18.3	-17.3	-18.1	-19.1
<b>Stand. Dev.</b>	3.0	3.1	3.4	3.6

Figure 6. Histogram for Namibia's net worth



#### IV. Conclusions

In this paper, we made a case for a new methodology to assess fiscal sustainability based on the estimation of the country's net worth and its distribution as a function of a changing macroeconomic environment. We illustrated our methodology by applying the proposed balance-sheet approach to Argentina, Chile and Namibia and run specific counterfactual scenarios: the fiscal sensitivity to a decline in relevant commodity prices (we find that Chile's fiscal accounts can significantly deteriorate with a decline in the price of copper) and a real devaluation (we find a large positive effect for Chile and a minor negative impact for Argentina) and to increased growth (we find that Namibia's fiscal accounts deteriorate). The finding that a partially dollarized country like Argentina holds a roughly balanced dollar position illustrates how fiscal sustainability ultimately depends in a complex way on the overall structure of revenues and expenditures, of which debt represents but a small fraction.

Our analysis is liable to some of the criticisms of the traditional approach: the results are sensitive to the assumptions, and particularly to the stability of the estimated response function and the discount rate chosen. They also do not take into account future changes in fiscal policy, which in many cases determines the likelihood of a fiscal problem down the road. For example, our exercise for Argentina took place at a time where fiscal policy looked strongly sustainable with positive net worth. Probably because of this fiscal strength, fiscal policy started to weaken substantially and persistently in a way that no debt analysis based on historical data could have anticipated.

To conclude, we believe that our analysis changes significantly the way in which the response of government accounts to real and financial shocks is assessed. As such, it can usefully complement traditional approaches to the pricing of debt instruments or, more specifically, to the evaluation of IMF programs and multilateral debt relief initiatives. The examples reported here provide sufficient indication of the relevance and replicability of this new methodology and highlight the need to revisit the way in which growth or currency exposure is usually modeled.

**Appendix Table A.1 VAR Coefficients**

	Argentina	Chile		Argentina	Chile
Real exchange rate equation			Output growth equation		
Real exchange rate			Real exchange rate		
L1	0.693*** (0.048)	1.141*** (0.183)	L1+	0.000 (0.000)	-0.019 (0.050)
L2	-0.355*** (0.068)	-0.481** (0.242)	L2+	0.000 (0.000)	-0.045 (0.066)
L3	0.136** (0.067)	0.332 (0.241)	L3+	0.000 (0.000)	-0.015 (0.066)
L4	-0.040 (0.048)	-0.003 (0.168)	L4+	0.000 (0.000)	0.085* (0.046)
Output growth			Output Growth		
L1	-1.446*** (0.307)	-0.106 (0.616)	L1	0.807*** (0.157)	-0.079 (0.169)
L2	-0.247 (0.366)	-0.973** (0.607)	L2	-0.114 (0.201)	-0.154 (0.167)
L3	-0.436 (0.334)	0.354 (0.648)	L3	0.011 (0.190)	-0.137 (0.178)
L4	-0.168 (0.276)	-0.828* (0.533)	L4	-0.071 (0.148)	-0.200 (0.147)
Post Convertibility dummy	0.547*** (0.024)		Post Convertibility dummy+	0.000 0.000	
Us rates L1	0.862 (1.312)	-2.126 (1.978)	Us rates L1	0.289 (0.682)	0.401 (0.544)
Us rates L2	2.121 (1.320)	3.869** (1.972)	Us rates L2	-0.471 (0.684)	0.640 (0.542)
Constant	0.116 (0.072)	-0.024 (0.541)	Constant	0.012 (0.014)	-0.330** (0.149)
Copper L1		0.000 (0.000)	Copper L1		0.000 (0.000)
Copper L2		0.024 (0.541)	Copper L2		0.000 (0.000)

\* significant at 10%; \*\* significant at 5%; \*\*\* significant at 1%

Standard errors in parentheses

+ for variables restricted to zero

*Table A. 2. Coefficients for Expenditure and Income for Chile*

	Value Added Tax	Income Tax	Exports Tax	Other income
Log(real exchange rate)	0.003** (0.000)	-0.025 (0.013)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.005 (0.006)
Growth of GDP	-0.002 (0.006)	-0.139 (0.120)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.122 (0.078)
Constant	-0.006* (0.003)	0.311** (0.076)	0.013** (0.002)	0.059 (0.035)
Other control variables	No	Yes	No	No
R-squared	0.601	0.436	0.000	0.082

	Government Consumption	Transfers	Capital Expenditures
Log(real exchange rate)	0.005 (0.002)	0.022** (0.004)	-0.001 (0.007)
Growth of GDP	-0.092** (0.032)	-0.069 (0.060)	0.002 (0.098)
Constant	0.026 (0.014)	-0.082** (0.027)	0.041 (0.045)
Other control variables	Yes	No	No
R-squared	0.774	0.424	0.001

*Table A. 3. Coefficients for Expenditure and Income for Argentina*

	Value Added Tax	Income Tax	Other income	Exports
Log(real exchange rate)	-0.047* (0.022)	0.008 (0.044)	0.100** (0.024)	0.151** (0.015)
Growth of GDP	-0.017 (0.053)	-0.01 (0.027)	-0.177** (0.059)	-0.074 (0.036)
Constant	0.089** (0.011)	0.015 (0.017)	0.003 (0.012)	0.032** (0.007)
Other control variables	No	Yes	No	No
R-squared	0.241	0.903	0.579	0.845

	Government Consumption	Transfers	Capital Expenditures
Log(real exchange rate)	-0.023* (0.008)	0.096** (0.016)	-0.055** (0.009)
Growth of GDP	0.007 (0.020)	-0.041 (0.039)	0.024 (0.021)
Constant	0.045** (0.004)	0.033** (0.008)	0.040** (0.004)
Other control variables	Yes	Yes	No
R-squared	0.680	0.646	0.680

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